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CASE NOTE: GOLDEN GATE
RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION V. CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO:
SETTING THE STAGE FOR SUPREME
COURT REVIEW OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT PREEMPTION MATTER
IN THE HISTORY OF ERISA
JOSHUA WALDBESER*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Within the last three years, a number of states and
municipalities have enacted measures designed to ameliorate
rising health care costs by shifting the financial burden of health
care for uncovered workers to private employers. These laws,
which are collectively referred to as "Play or Pay" or "Fair Share"
laws (the nomenclature chosen tends to hinge upon the who the
speaker is), do differ in their specific operation, but all share a
single characteristic which defines them as a group: they all
require that certain employers either pay a minimum amount
toward some form of private health coverage for employees, or fork
over funds to the respective government entity, at least
purportedly to aid the government(s) in defraying the rising costs
of health coverage for the otherwise uninsured.
As of the writing of this Case Note, there are at least two
states which have such laws currently on the books, and which
have not been successfully challenged in court as being preempted
on the grounds of having an impermissible relationship to
employee benefit plans under ERISA Section 514.
In
Massachusetts, the State's Health Care Reform Law1 requires,
among other things, that employers with more than eleven
employees in the State offer a cafeteria benefit plan and satisfy
* Mr. Waldbeser is an associate in Employee Benefits and Executive
Compensation Practice Group of Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP. He received

both his L.L.M. in Employee Benefits Law, with honors, in 2008, as well as his
J.D., cum laude, from The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. Mr.
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1. The Massachusetts Health Care Reform Law comprises Chapter 58 of
the state's statutory code.
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one of two tests (one based on the amount of employer
contributions, the other on the rate of participation by employees)
to demonstrate that the employer's financial contributions to the
Plan are "fair and reasonable." If neither of the tests is satisfied, a
$295 per employee "contribution" must be remitted to the
Commonwealth. In Vermont, employers must pay $365 per year
to the State for each of their uncovered "full-time equivalent"
workers to help fund the State's "Catamount Health" program,
even for those who decline the employer's existing coverage,
2
subject to certain exemptions.
In addition, there are two such laws which have been struck
down as preempted by ERISA. The first mandate, which was
known as the (Maryland) "Fair Share Health Care Fund Act," and
which was successfully challenged by a trade group led by WalMart, would have required large employers (the statute was
specifically targeted at Wal-Mart only) to contribute eight percent
of their payroll toward private health coverage or pay the
difference to the State.3 In ruling that the law was preempted by
ERISA, the Fourth Circuit in Retail Industry Leaders Association
v. Fielder,4 noted that the choice between paying an amount to the
State for which no concrete benefit could be expected, or paying
the same for health care for employees, which would certainly
improve retention and morale among existing workers and help
recruit new ones, was a "choice" upon which there could only be
one rational conclusion. 5
As such, it was held, by leaving
employers with no rational choice but to structure their (likely)
ERISA-governed benefit plans to provide a required level of
benefits, the statute was effectively a state mandate governing the
structure of employers' ERISA plans, and was thus preempted and
unenforceable. 6 Relying heavily on Fielder, The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York struck down Suffolk
County, New York's version of a "Fair Share" statute, only months
later, and on essentially the same grounds. 7
Thus, until recently, major "Play or Pay" or "Fair Share" laws
have fallen into one of two categories: those of which there has
been no favorable or unfavorable determination in court, and those
2. The law under which the Catamount Health Program was established
is Vermont H. 861-The Health Care Affordability Act, and was signed into
law on May 25, 2006. For more information on the program, see
http://www.catamounthealth.org/.

3. The Act was codified at 2006 MD. CODE.
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to 107 (West 2008).
4. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).

5. Id. at 193.
6. Id. at 193-94.
7. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403
(E.D.N.Y. 2007)
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which were struck down. However, it appears likely that there
will soon be a third category with at least a single member:
mandates which have been specifically upheld as not being
preempted by ERISA, and thus, enforceable.
II.

THE SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE

In 2006, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors enacted, and
the Mayor signed into law, the San Francisco Health Care
Security Ordinance ("the Ordinance").8 The Ordinance generally
requires local employers with more than twenty employees 9 to
make minimum aggregate health care expenditures either for
private coverage, or as contributions to a City-run Plan, based on
the number of hours worked by covered employees. 10 For 2008,
employers with between twenty and ninety-nine employees are
required to make such expenditures in the amount of $1.17 per
work hour, and those with one-hundred or more employees are
required to pay $1.76 per work hour.11 Employers are required to
pay (to the city plan) only to the extent that the amounts they
expend for other employee health coverage do not meet the
requisite thresholds, and thus many employers will not be directly
affected. However, the Ordinance also requires employers to
maintain records to demonstrate their compliance, regardless of
12
the method it is achieved.
III. LITIGATION
A trade association representing restaurants in the San
Francisco area brought suit against the City and County of San
Francisco, seeking a judicial declaration that the Ordinance, like
the state statute in Fielder, was preempted by ERISA and could
therefore not be enforced upon its membership. 13 Their wish was
granted by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, which, applying a similar analysis as did the Fourth
Circuit in Fielder,found that the Ordinance was indeed preempted
having both an impermissible connection with, and making

8. S. F. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.1-14.8, available at http://www.municode.com
/Resources/gateway.asp? pid=14131&sid-5.
9. § 14.1(11 & 12) define the "medium" and "large" businesses which are
covered by the law as those with between twenty and ninety-nine employees
on average, and those with 100 or more employees on average, respectively,
and subject to certain exceptions.
10. See generally § 14.3 (providing a description of the required
expenditures).
11. § 14.1(8)(a & b), as indexed.
12. See generally § 14.4.
13. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco (Golden
Gate I), 535 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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14
unlawful reference to, employee benefit plans.
The group's victory, however, was short-lived. The City and
labor union intervenors brought a motion for stay, asking that the
Ordinance be permitted to be enforced, pending appeal before the
Ninth Circuit. Their motion was granted in January of 2008.15 At
present, the Ordinance is therefore in force and employers in the
area whose health care expenditures do not otherwise meet the
Law's requirements have already begun to make mandatory
contributions to the City Plan.
However, for the Plaintiffs and other advocates of ERISA
preemption over these types of local mandates, the fact that the
Ordinance is currently in place pending appeal is hardly the most
disconcerting facet of the matter. In granting the Defendants'
motion for stay, the three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit made a
number of indications that the Ordinance is likely to be upheld as
not preempted on appeal, and the District Court's contrary finding
reversed. First, in ruling on the Defendants' likelihood of success
on the merits, (which is one of the elements weighed in
determining the adequacy of such a petition, since such petitions
focus on the prevention of irreparable harm) the Panel found that
the Ordinance does not have any forbidden "connection with"
ERISA plans 16 and is unlikely to have a likewise impermissible
"reference to" such plans, 17 findings which directly contradict those
of the District Court. The language used by the Court is
exceptionally strong for this type of ruling, and seems to provide a
window to the Court Members' intentions that is decidedly not
subtle.
In addition, in granting the petition, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the restaurant association's argument that a heightened
standard of review should be applied because the granting of stay
would change the status quo.18 The Court, in fact, reached the
opposite conclusion, observing that an enforceable Ordinance
would have been the status quo but not for the District Court's
finding, and stating its belief that preservation of the status quo in
this matter demanded action, as non-action would result in
irreparable injuries to the citizens of San Francisco. 19 This

14. See generally id. The standard for determining whether a state law
"relates to" employee benefit plans for purposes of the preemption clause of
ERISA § 514(a) is whether the law "has a connection with OR reference to
such plans." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
15. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco (Golden
Gate II) 512 F.3d 1112 (2008).
16. Id. at 1120-24.
17. Id. at 1124-25.
18. Id. at 1116-17.
19. Id. at 1116 (citing Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 830 n. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) for the premise that the status
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finding, although innocuous enough on a theoretical level, may
likewise be an indicator (even if unconscious) of the Court
Members' intentions to uphold the Ordinance upon full appeal
before the Court. Why?
The possible irreparable injuries upon which the Court
expressed concern 20 in granting the Defendants' motion for stay
focused on the unavailability of preventative and other treatments
which would result if stay were denied pending the Court's
determination on appeal. Naturally, the argument that these
concerns justified the Court's ruling becomes much more powerful
if one contemplates that the Ordinance will be upheld and become
the permanent law of the land, meaning that the granting of stay
would act to prevent injuries which could have been prevented if
not for the District Court's soon to be overturned ruling. If, on the
other hand, one assumes that the Ordinance would be found to be
preempted on appeal, then the granting of stay would serve no
purpose but to provide for a temporary period of treatment
availability for otherwise uninsured citizens, only delaying the
inevitable consequences that would result from the Ordinance
being struck down.
While, of course, the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the
merits of this case, one might wonder how two Circuits of the
United States Court of Appeals could possibly reach opposite
conclusions on a question which seems so fundamental to the issue
of ERISA Section 514 preemption. A full compare/contrast of the
Ninth Circuit's granting of stay in Golden Gate and the Fourth
Circuit's determination in Fielderis beyond the scope or purpose of
this Case Note, and would in fact be premature since the 9th
Circuit has yet to render its final ruling. However, if there is a
single factor which differentiates the two holdings, it must be this:
In Golden Gate, the Court applies ERISA's preemption provision
with a focus on the effects the Ordinance would have on ERISA21
governed plans, ultimately concluding that the effects are slight.
In Fielder, the Fourth Circuit considered the issue of ERISA
preemption in a broader light-framing its discussion in terms of
the relationship between employers and the benefits provided to
their employees (i.e., the subject matter of employee benefits) as

quo may be a condition of action, not rest, and that rest may be "exactly what
will inflict the irreparable injury upon complainant").
20. See id. at 1125, noting that:
It is uncontested that individuals without health coverage are
significantly less likely to seek timely medical care than those will
health coverage. Lack of timely access to health care poses serious
health risks ....
It is clear that otherwise avoidable human suffering,
illness, and possibly death will result if a stay is denied.
21. See generally id. at 1120-25.
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constituting the issue of exclusive Federal control.
The United States Supreme Court has provided a framework
for determining whether a state or local law sufficiently "relates
to" employee benefits plans so as to cause it to be preempted under
ERISA Section 514(a). To wit, a law will be found to be so
preempted if it either (1) has a connection with, or (2) reference to,
employee benefit plans. 22 In evaluating San Francisco's likelihood
to prevail on the merits of the case, and with respect to the first
item, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Ordinance does not
have an impermissible connection with employee benefit plans,
contrasting the Ordinance from other state mandates which had
been struck down for this reason. Once again, a full comparison
between the Ninth Circuit's opinion in granting stay, and the
holdings of the District Court and the Fourth Circuit in Fielder
would be premature, but the respective Courts' different
treatments of the issue of whether these types of laws have an
impermissible connection with employee benefit plans is a useful
example for illustrating how the two approaches differ.
With respect to this issue, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
Ordinance "stands in stark contrast"23 to three state mandates
which have been found preempted by the Ninth Circuit and
United States Supreme Court, and likened it instead to a fourth
example which was found not to be preempted. Specifically, the
Court analyzed the following cases:
- In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,24 the United States Supreme Court
struck down a Washington statute which required certain
beneficiary designations to be given effect even to the extent they
contravened ERISA plan designations made in accordance with
plan requirements.
This mandate was struck down on the
grounds that it required ERISA plan administrators to adhere to
local rules which were in conflict with governing plan documents. 25
- In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.26 in a suit over two New York
statutes governing benefits for pregnancy, one statute was found
preempted and the other unenforceable with respect to ERISA
plans, with the Court noting that laws which require the payment
27
of specific benefits are preempted under Section 514(a).
- In Standard Oil v. Agsalud, both the Ninth Circuit and
United States Supreme Court struck down a state statute which
would have required employers to provide employees with a

22. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519
U.S. 316, 324 (1997).
23. Golden Gate II, 512 F.3d at 1121.
24. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
25. Id. at 147.
26. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
27. Id. at 97-100.
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prepaid health plan covering a wide range of required benefits, 28
on the grounds that the law would have regulated the type of
29
benefits provided by employers.
- On the other hand, in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 30 a statemandated surcharge to be collected by hospitals from patients
covered by commercial insurers but not from those insured by Blue
Cross/Blue Shield was found not to be preempted, with the United
States Supreme Court noting that the law amounted only to an
indirect economic influence over the choices of insurers available
to ERISA plans and other entities.
In short, the Ninth Circuit used the above four cases to
illustrate its belief in the sine qua non of whether a state or local
statute is preempted by ERISA on account of an impermissible
connection with employee benefit plans: whether the law is simply
an indirect economic influence over such plans, or whether it
crosses the line and directly regulates matters central to plan
administration. 31 With respect to the San Francisco Health Care
Security Ordinance, the Court thus concluded:
The Ordinance does not require any employer to adopt an ERISA
plan or other health plan. Nor does it require any employer to
provide specific benefits through an existing ERISA or other health
plan. Any employer covered by the Ordinance may fully discharge
its expenditure obligations by making the required level of employee
health care expenditures, whether those expenditures are made in
whole or in part to an ERISA plan, or in whole or in part to the City.
The Ordinance thus preserves ERISA's "uniform regulatory
32
regime."

Predictably, the approaches taken by the District Court in
this matter and the Fourth Circuit in Fielder do not approach the
problem of preserving ERISA's "uniform regulatory regime" in the
same manner.
In Fielder, the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected the notion
that the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Travelers (relied
on by the Ninth Circuit, as stated above) provided a basis upon
which Maryland's Fair Share Law could be deemed a merely
indirect economic influence, and thus, as not having an
plans. 33
benefits
to employee
connection
impermissible
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit noted that the statute (pertaining
28. 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 801 (1982).
29. Id. at 766.
30. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
31. Golden Gate II, 512 F.3d at 1122-23.
32. See id. at 1121 (citing Aetna Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208
(2004)).
33. Fielder,475 F.3d at 195-96.
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to hospital surcharges) at issue in Travelers was "inapposite" to
the Maryland law, pointing out that the hospital surcharges in
Travelers constituted only an indirect influence, whereas
Maryland's Fair Share Law directly affected the structuring of
employee benefit plans. 34 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit in
Fielder concluded that, regardless of the fact that employers under
the Maryland Fair Share Law were afforded the choice to comply
with the statute through means other than establishment of an
ERISA plan, (by paying the State) that "(t)he undeniable fact is
that the vast majority of any employer's healthcare spending
occurs through ERISA plans. Thus, the primary subjects of the
Fair Share Act are ERISA plans, and any attempt to comply with
the Act would have direct effects on the employer's ERISA
plans." 35 The Court went on to point out that a proliferation of
these types of laws throughout the country would require
employers to adhere to varying requirements from jurisdiction to
36
jurisdiction.
Stripped to its essentials, the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Fielder stands for the proposition that it is the relationship and
subject matter of employee benefit plans which is a matter of
exclusive Federal control, and that a statute which affects the
structure of ERISA plans cannot escape the grasp of ERISA
preemption simply by providing a "non-ERISA" avenue for
employers to comply with minimum healthcare spending
mandates. It is noteworthy that, having reached the conclusion
that Maryland's Fair Share Law was preempted as having an
impermissible connection with employee benefit plans, it did not
address the question of whether the Law was preempted on
account of having "a reference to" such plans, 37 which is the second
38
branch of the preemption inquiry, as stated above.
The District Court in Golden Gate, of course, had held that
the San Francisco Ordinance had an impermissible connection
with employee benefit plans, a holding it reached through the
39
application of factors gleaned from a Ninth Circuit case.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 196.
36. Id. at 197.
37. Id. at 193 n.2.
38. Golden Gate II, 512 F.3d at 1121.
39. Golden Gate , 535 F.Supp.2d at 975. The factors used by the District
Court are taken from Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. J.W.J.
Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1998). The factors cited are:
(1) whether the state law regulates the types of benefits of ERISA
employee welfare plans; (2) whether the state law requires the
establishment of a separate employee benefit plan to comply with the
law; (3) whether the state law imposes reporting, disclosure, funding, or
vesting requirements for ERISA plans; and (4) whether the state law
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First, the Court noted that the Ordinance "regulates the types
of benefits of ERISA employee welfare plans," 40 again paying
credence to the concept that it is the relationshipcreated through
the provision of benefits to employees from employers that is
intended to be an exclusively federal matter under ERISA's
preemption clause. Similarly, the Court emphasizes that the
Ordinance imposes recordkeeping and administrative burdens on
existing ERISA plans, 41 a second factor cited by the Ninth
Circuit 42 in another matter with respect to the determination of
ERISA preemption. Finally, on the specific issue of interference
with the employee benefit plan relationship, and citing to Fielder,
the District Court had held that the Ordinance "directly and
indirectly affects the structure and administration of ERISA
plans," regardless of the fact that employers could satisfy their
obligations through contributions to the City-run plan, noting that
this is "a relationship that has traditionally been governed by
ERISA." 43 Once again, it bears note that the District Court's
holding with respect to safeguarding the employee benefits
relationship as an exclusively Federal matter was reached only
after applying the holdings of several Ninth Circuit cases. 44 If the
Ninth Circuit does indeed uphold the statute on appeal as not
being preempted by ERISA, it will be interesting to see to what
extent the Court is able to craft an opinion which is reconcilable
with several of its own former pronouncements (which would seem
to support the opposite outcome).

regulated certain ERISA relationships, including relationships between
an ERISA plan and employer and, to the extent an employee benefit
plan is involved, between the employer and the employee.

Id.
40. Id. at 975-76; see Fielder, 475 F.3d at 195-96.
41. Golden Gate I, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
42. Fielder,475 F.3d at 195-96.
43. Golden Gate I, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
44. See id. (citing Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson,
201 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[A] core factor leading to the conclusion
that a state law is preempted is that the claim bears on an ERISA-regulated
relationship"); Blue Cross of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs., 187 F.3d 1045,
1053 (9th Cir. 1999); Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 957 (9th
Cir. 1998) (in determining whether state law would "frustrate the purpose" of
the statute, a factor is the existence of state-law regulation of ERISA
relationships); Operating Eng'rs, 135 F.3d at 678 (A preemption factor is
"whether the state law regulates certain ERISA relationships .... ")
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CONCLUSION

To note that upholding of the Ordinance by the 9th Circuit
could change the landscape of employer-provided health care
coverage is the very definition of an understatement to the
employee benefits practitioner. Of course, if the Court does uphold
the Ordinance, as many expect, the clear immediate effect will be
the removal of any Federal barrier for any states or municipalities
in the Circuit's jurisdiction of California, Hawaii, Alaska, Oregon,
Washington, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana from enacting
similar measures. Equally manifest is that such a ruling would
result in a decided split, at least between the 9th and 4th Circuits,
on a Federal issue of the utmost importance, setting the stage for
likely review by the U.S. Supreme Court. It is difficult to imagine
any issue relating to ERISA preemption as going down in the
annals of employee benefits law history as having more farreaching implications than the question of whether state and local
governments can enact and enforce such mandates.

